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1 Introduction 
In markets where the demand is not stable over time and production is not storable, firms 
must install a level of capacity that meets the highest foreseable levels of demando This is 
the case of the electricity market where the operation of its different components must be 
coordinated in order to meet demand in each time of use with adequate quality charac-
teristics. For these reasons the electric system needs to maintain a maximum generating 
capacity sufficient to meet the greatest energy demands, but since the behaviour is not 
stable, sorne capacity remains idle during offpeak periods. 
In order to reduce the costs of idle capacity electric systems install several types of 
generating .equipment. Base load po\\'er is meet \vith equipment having a high cost of 
acquisition (capital costs) but a lo\\' cost of operation. On the other hand, peak-loads are 
meet with equipment having a lower cost of acquisition and a higher cost of operation. 
The 10"'er cost adquisition cost of the peaking equipment allows to reduce the cost of 
idleness in offpeaks periods. This results in higher marginal operating costs when demand 
peaks. 
To account for t he particular characteristics of t he electric sector, tariffs must be 
clesigned to separetely account for capacity and operating costs, and refiect the diferences 
in these costs among the technologies used. That is, tariffs must be designed in function 
of the two dimensions of electricity, power and duration. A sort of tariffs of this form 
are called \Yright tariffs in the United States and which are prominently offered by public 
ntility that produces and distributes electric power in France. \Vright tariffs attempt to 
refiect long run cost structure of the utility by setting charges based on the duration of 
each increment of the load dming the year. That is, a nnit of power supplied for a specific 
clnration in the long 1'1m costs the utility the capital cost of one unit of generating capacity 
ami an operating cost proportional to the d1ll'ation and the operating cost of that type 
of generator1 HO\\'e\'er, the implementation of these tariffs requires a knowledge of the 
exact consumption pattern of each consumer through time, for which sophisticated and 
expensive indi\'idnal meters ",ould be needed. In some countries like Spain this problem 
has been soh'ed by approximating individualload-duration curves by the utilization level 
clefined as the ratio of consumption to power used, "'hich allows for the design of tariffs 
based on individual aggregated consumption. 
This papel' develops a model for \Vright tariff design for the electricity market when 
the utilization level is used as an approximation to duration. A regulator with an objective 
of maximizing consumer ",elfare, with a restriction that the producer must cover its costs, 
is considered. This model is used to compute an optimal two part tariff for the utilization 
level of the Spanish residential sector considering several hypothesis on the configuration of 
the generating equipment. This will allow to estimate the degree optimality of the current 
tariff and to obtain an aproximation of the efficiency losses attributable to the existing 
regulatory regime for the case of Spain. This model is an application of Oren, Smith and 
Wilson (1985) where the duration of consumption is aproximated by the utilization level. 
~Iost studies of the literature derive optimal tariffs for electricity without explicitly 
considering its multidimensional character. These studies do not consider the existence 
lSee Wilson (1993), 
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of a capacity and an operating cost, and use the average cost as approximation to the 
marginal cost (see Dimopoulos (1981) and Buisán (1992)). This work presents electricity 
as two dimension product and show that, by using utilization levels as an aproximation to 
duration, the marginal cost is the sum of the capacity and operating cost of the efficient 
technology for the duration. It is also showed that the costs can be expresed as a func-
tion of the consumption of individuals and so, the results with unidimensional prices are 
applicable.2 
The assumptions that are common in the literature of non linear pricing in the sense of 
not considering rent effects and the inability of product resale are adopted. The regulator 
may supervi,se the consumption of individuals and he knows the distribution of consumer 
types and their preferences. It is assumed that the regulator uses the concept of utiliza-
tion le\'el, defined as the ratio of consumption to power used, as an aproximation to the 
consumption pattern of the individuals. 
The structure of the \York is as fo11o\\'s. In the second section the basic framework of 
the capacity price model is presented. The third section adapts the model for the case in 
which duration is aproximated by utilization levels. In the fourth section the parameters 
llsed in the empirical analysis are specified. The fifth section is dedicated to compute two 
part tariffs by lltilization le\'C~ls for residential consumers and to efficiency analysis. Fina11y 
conclllsions are presented, 
2 Basic concepts 
Load-duration Curve 
In the case of services snch as electrical po\\'er where supply is comparatively stable 
\\'ith rcspect to demand, this can be dcscriLed in t\\'O ways: by dcmand at difIerent hours 
of the day and by the load-duration cnf\'e gi\'ing the nnmbers of hours that demand exceed 
a gi\'en le\'e1. Figure 1 presents the load-duration curve for 1993. 
Insert Figure 1 
The h\'o axis of the load-duration curve may be interpreted as the consumption rate 
and the time duration, and its magnitudes are refered to as capacities. The maximum 
capaci ty level represents vertically the maximum consumer demand ("demand peak"), 
and h¿rizonta11y, the maximum time interval in which the system operates (for example a 
year). In the case of electrical energy consumption the dimensions are power and duration, 
and the load-duration curve can be interpreted as the number of hours H(l) for which the 
power demanded is at least l, or as the smallest power level L(h) that is demanded for 
a duration of no more than h hours. H(·) and L(·) are nonincreasing, with L(O) and 
L(l) denoting peak and load demand respectively, suposing that duration is expresed as 
a fraction of the time period considered. 
The area under the load curve represents the consumption set Q in kilowatt-hours of 
the individual. In this sense, the load-duration curve may be interpreted as a function of 
2See Goldman, Leland and Sibley(1984) and Brown and Sibley(1986). 
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the distribution that determines the probability (in fraction of cycle hours) that the pO\ver 
demand by the individual will be greater than a determined level. 
Costs 
In order to determine the costs associated to a consumption set Q determined by a load-
duration curve it is considered that the generators use different production technologies. 
In the linear case 
ci(h) = Ji + Vi h, 
is the cost per kilowatt using techonology i for a duration h, where Ji is the unitary 
capacity cost (amortizated cost of generating equipment per kilowatt of power), and Vi is 
the operating cost per kilowatthour (kWh). These capacity and operating costs are such 
that each technology is the most efficient in sorne range of the duration, as long as there 
is infinite dh·isibility.3 
Projecting the efficiency range of each teclmology onto the load-duration cun'e we may 
ootain the optimal capacity configuration (optimal technology mix), this is, the number of 
k\V of cach technology that must Le installed in order to supply the energy requirements 
of the system. Thus in a three technology case, as in figure 2, the low capacity cost 
technology (1) will Le used to satisfy the peak load ",hile the lo\\' marginal cost technology 
(III) will be more appropiate for the base load, and the intermediate technology (II) meets 
t he sholllder load. 
Insert Figure 2 
The total cost of su])ply t he consumption set Q, determined Ly the load-duration curve 
\\'ith the optimal technology mix may be obtained for a particular duration range using 
tIle cost fnnctions corresponding to the technologies dispatched in that range. It should 
noted that the efficient operating cost of any generating unit as a function of duration is 
gi\'en by the lower e11\'elope of each teclmologies particular cost function. This envelope 
may be interpreted as a nonlinear cost fllnction of capacity 11se, and its concavity reflects 
the fact that technologies with lo\\' perating costs are assigned to capacity llnits that are 
llsed for longer periods of time. In the linear case the efficient cost envelope will Le 
e(h) = mini ci(h), 
wheré i(h) indicates the efficient technology for duration h. 
The total cost of the consumption set when horizontal slices are considered can be 
oLtained by adding the costs originated Ly each kilowatt of power used, which will depend 
on the technology that has supplied them and on the duration. Thus, for example, in 
figure 3 it is found that a kilowatt of power l in the interval Lb < l < La gives rise to 
a capacity cost 12 and a marginal operating cost V2 since it is supplied Ly techonology 
II, which is the most efficient for a kilowatt of duration h, Hl < h < H2. The total cost 
associated with a load-duration curve like that of figure 3, with a maximum power demand 
3With infinite divisivility each kilo\\'att is produced by a technology and thus an optimally configured 
generating system may not include technologies that are cost dominated. 
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of L, when three technologies intervene will be given by 
¡Lh ¡La ¡L C(L) = Co + (13 + V3 H (X))dx + (12 + V2 H (X))dx + (JI + VI H (X))dx Ll Lh La 
where Co represents fixed costs not associated with production (stranded, administrative).4 
Insert Figure 3 
Wright tariffs and utilization level 
\Vright tariffs fix prices taking into account the number of hours each kilowatt that is 
demanded is used and, accordingly, the)' take as reference the horizontal slice costs of the 
load-duration curve that \\'ere analized in the previous section. In this sense these tariffs 
attempt to adapt to the cost structure deri\'ed from the generating equipment in order to 
meet the load-duration cun'e. That is, a unit of po",er supplied for a specific duration 
in the long run costs the utility the capital cost of one unit of generating capacity and 
an operating cost proportional to the cluration and the operating cost of that type of 
generator. 5 
Direct implementation of \\'right tariffs requires, ne\'ertheless, kno",ledge of the exact 
consumption pattern of each indiyidual through time, for which sophisticated and expen-
si\'e indi\'idual measuring equipment \Yould be needed. In some countries this problem 
has been solyed by aproximating indiyidual load-duration cun'e by the utilization cate-
gory defined as the ratio of consmnption to po\\'er used by the consumer, and represents 
a clirect relation \Yith the inclividuals consumption pattern. Thus it is found that the pro-
portion of consumption in a peak load period is decreasing on the utilization level, ",hile 
the proportion of consumption in a base load period is increasing. 
On the other hand, the lltilization le\'el summarizes in one variable (quantity con-
smned) the information of the t\Yo dimensions of electrical electricity, power and duration, 
\\"hich allo\\'s for the clesign of tariffs based on individual consumption exclusively. This 
abo explains that in utilization level tariffs one cannot consider usage prices and capacity 
I)l'ices, and that different parts of the tariff contribute to covering usage and capacity costs. 
Xeyertheless is necesary to note that the use of the utilization level as and aproximation 
to individualload-duration curves has t",o important problems. In the first place, it could 
be treating similarly t\\'o consumers that having the same utilization level have a different 
consumption pattern" In second place, as is noted in \Vilson (1993), it is assumed that 
consumer demands are sincronized with system demand, and then there exist a capacity 
sufficient to supply the individual power of each consumer. In practice, however, consumer 
demands are relatively asincronous and equipment that is idle for a particular consumer 
can be used to serve another, thus the total capacity necesary will be inferior to the sum 
of the individual maximum po\Yer demanded. 
4In the appendix is presented the case of cost aggregation using vertical intervals. A more general cost 
formula is presented in Oren, et.al.(1986). 
SIn the short run the cost structure may be modified by demand or operating cost variations, thus 
period of use tariffs associated with real system demand each hourly period are also used. 
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3 A theoretical model of utilization level tariffs 
Consumption set 
The use ofthe utilization level concept in order to aproximate the duration ofthe consump-
tion of the kilowatthours used is equivalent to considering the individuals consumption set 
to be a rectangle of height equal to the power llsed L and a base equal to the utiliza-
tion level hu (see figure 4). That is, each consumer is associated with the most efficient 
tecnology for a duration range equal to his utilization level. 
Insert Figure 4 
The cost function 
Consider a rectangular load-duration cun'e q = [hu, L] that refiects consumption corre-
sponcling to L kilo,,"atts of pO\\'er usecl for a maximum duration of hu, which is determined 
by the ratio bet,,"een consumption and the po,,"er llsed, hu = f. 
The cost of supplying consumption set q \vith an optimal mix of production tech-
nologies, that is, \\'hen consumption is supplied completely by the efficient technology for 
duration hu is 
C(L) = Co + L (Ji + Vihu), 
\\"here Ji and Vi represent the unitary capacity cost and the unitary operating cost for 
the efficient technology for a duration h," L are the kilowatts of power used, and Co non 
procluctiye fixed costs. 
Using the clefinition of lltilization le\'el (h = f), the cost function may be expresed by 
C(q) = Co + m q, 
\\"here 177 represents the marginal cost of consuming an additional good, and may be defined 
as 
Ji 
711 = (- + Vi)' 
hu 
Thus, for a particular and constant utilization level, hu, costs are a function of k\Vh 
consumption. 
It' is implicitly assumed that consumers do not vary their consumption pattern and 
that the only way to raise their consumption is to raise the power used. Under this 
assumption it makes sense to think of marginal cost as the cost increment caused by using 
an additional k\V of power to be consumed for a duration of hu. Thus, marginal cost will 
be the sum of the capacity and operating costs of the efficient technology, as can be seen 
in t he cost function given.6 
Ho,,"ever, the cost of supplying consumption set q depends on the optimal technology 
mix used to meet the system load-duration curve. In this sense, the costs incurred in 
GThis assumption seems l'elati\"ely l'easonable for the l'esidential sector which is chal'actel'ized by a 
homogeneus and constant consumption pattel'n. 
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the supply of a consumption set q will result from agregating the costs incurred by the 
different generating techonologies usedo If it is supposed that j = 1, 000' s techonologies are 
used, with technology s being the most efficient for duration hu, the costs of supplying 
consumption set q will be 
s-l f· f f 
C(q) = Co + 2:)...1.. + Vj - ~ - vs)qj + (~ + vs)q, 
j=l hu hu hu 
",here qj = hulj are the consumptions supplied by the technologies j = 1, 000' s - 1, not 
efficient for duration hu, with lj being the power used of each technologY07 
Individuál demands 
The heterogeneity of consumers has a central role in nonlinear pricing because the payment 
structure is designed to induce self-selection between consumerso These differences are 
refiected in the consumption choiceso In this \Vay to increment efficiency the consumers 
pay different prices in function of their consumptiono This heterogeneity is represented 
by parameter e E [ft, e] which is characterized by a distribution function F(o)o Thus, it 
is assumed that consumer preferences can be represented by the utility function, U(q, e), 
\\"here q = [hu, L] is the quantity consumed by an individual with a lltilization level hu 
\\"ho uses L kilO\\"ats of pO\\Oer. 
Distributiol1 of types 
As the current tariff is Sllch that consumel's \\"ith diffel'ent preferences demand different 
amOllnts of the good, t he distriblltion of obsenoed consllmption can be nsed to approximate 
the clistl'ibution of consumel's types (see Castro, et.al., 1997)0 
Social welfare 
~et consnmer surpllls for each suscriber is clefined as a function of consllmption q and 
consumer type e by 
S(q, e) = rq p dq = _b_allbellbq(b-l)lbo Jo b - 1 
If T(q) is the tariff paid fol' consuming q llnits of the good, net surplus can be defined 
as the difference bet\\"een net surplus and payment, 
S(q, e) - T(q)o 
Social welfare derhoed. from the consumption of the pl'oduct is defined as the weighted sum 
of the monetary value of the net surplus of aH the consumers 
lV = (Xl [S(q, e) - T(q)]u'(e)f(e)de, 
Je.(T) 
whel'e the \\Oeight assigned to each suscriber u'(e) = e-r¡ is a function of the consumer 
type e and presents a constant demand elasticity Tlo Thus the larger is TI the larger is the 
weight assigned to the \Velfare of consumers with low consumption levelso Parameter e* 
identifies the marginal consumer that is indiferent between consuming and not consuming 
at the given tariffo 
7This is the case oE the residential sector electrical supply in 1993 which is studied in the next sectiono 
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Optimal Tariff 
A regulated firm that produces only one type of product is considered. This firm has 
to satisfy a budget constraint, that is, total revenues must be iqual total costs plus an 
exogeneuosly specified amount, B. This exogenous amount, B, can be positive, in concept 
of a profit or surplus aboye costs, zero when the firm must strictly cover costs, or nega-
tive when government subsidies are permited. The objective of the regulated firm is to 
maximize social welfare. The optimal tariff is derived then by maximizing social welfare 
w = (Xl [S(q, B) - pq - AJu'(B)f(B)dB, 
JO.(T) 
suoject to the firm's oudget constraint 
(Xl T(q(p, B)) j(B) dO - C(Q) - B = O, 
JO.(T) 
and that the marginal consumer B~ obtain a non negatiye net snrplus 
S(q,O.) - T(q(p,O.)) 2: O. 
Total consumption is definecl as 
Q = j':X; q(p, B)j(O)dB. 
O.(T) 
4 Especification of the parameters 
In order to compute the optimal t<niff by utilization le\"el for residential consumption of 
electricity data on consumption, re\"elllles and prices refering to tariff 2.0 for 1993 of the 
Spanish electricity system hm'e Leen \lsed (see appendix). The year 1993 is used a uase year 
since it represents a normal year prior to regulatory reformo The tariff 2.0 of the Spanish 
tariff strncture is targeted for conS1llners with used power in the range O.77k\V to 15k\V, 
practically all residential conS11mers. In 1993 there where more than 17 million suscribers 
to tariff 2.0 that represented more than 93% of the total number of consumers, with a 
contracted po\\"er of more than 60690 megawatts (l\I\V) and an aproximate consumption 
36960 million k\Vh through the year, which accounts for 28.8% of total consumption. The 
total re\"enue generated by the tariff \\"as more than 747340 million pesetas (ptas), this 
amounted to 4070 of the total revenues of the industry. 
Level of residential utilization 
In order to compute the utilization level of residential sector, considering a similar con-
s\llllption pattern for all the suscribers to tariff 2.0, 61.61% of total power used is consid-
ered as po\\"er used for residential consumers taking into account that the revenues from 
power charged amounted to 61.6170 of total power used in 1993. Thus, given the 36920 
gigawatts-hour (G\Vh) of residential demand in 1993 an utilization level of 2498 hours is 
obtained, that is, a short utilization level is obtained. 
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Costs 
In 1993 demand was covered by a mixed thermic-hydrolectric generating system, in which 
the hydrolectric power represented 31. 72% of total instaHed power, with a production of 
aproximately 18% of total production. 
The hydro technology of the Spanish system has the role of regulating the system 
meeting demand peaks in all time periods. Thus, it cannot be concluded that hydro 
technology is responsible for a specific level of lltilization. In this sense, it's costs cannot 
be assigned to a particular consumption, but rather aH consumers, regardless of their 
ntilization level, are responsible for covering its costs. In this way, taking into account 
that consurp.ption of tariff 2.0 in 1993 represented 28.8% of total consumption, it is assumed 
that 28.8% of hydrolectric prodnction (6705 ?\IWh) has been assigned to meet residential 
demando 
Teclmology PO\\'er Capacity cost Operating cost Production 
(~IW) (ptasjkW) (ptasjkWh) (GWh) 
:\nclear 7401 46977 1.2494 53538 
Soft coal 59G1 13G91 5.G351 2897G 
Brown lignite 1950 20G74 5.1593 119GO 
Black lignite 14.50 20793 5.8228 8178 
Imported coal 1314 17404 3.25GO 8G01 
Gas 7910 4732 4.5871 1795 
Hyclro 1G996 7900 0.7499 23282 
TaLle 1: Teclmologies data in 1993.8 
In terms of eqllipmenL the Spanish electric system has several types of generating tech-
nologies: nuclear, coal, and gas, all of ,yhich were used to cover electrical demand in 1993. 
In table 1 the most important cost characteristics as weH as total ouput of the generating 
eC¡llipment are presented. Capacity costs are obtained considering the standard costs of 
amortization and retribntion, and the fixed costs of operation and maintenance set by the 
Stable Legal Framework (SLF), the legislative act that regulates the Spanish electricity 
inclllstry, for each active generating plant. Variable costs are obtained by aggregating fuel 
costs, and ,-ariable costs of operation and maintenance.9 
Demand 
It is ~ssumed that the indi,-idual demand function is isoelastic, and depend on the price 
p paid for each unit consumed and on the parameter () that identifies each consumer type 
( t his ,,-ill depend among ot her t hings on his income level) 
where a is a scale parameter and b represents the price elasticity of demando Note that the 
demands are ordered according to the parameter (), in such a way that if each consumer 
consumes according to his preferences, a larger valuation for the product (a larger ()) 
results in higher consumption. 
9These costs have been obtained considering all active plants in 1993, sorne of which were fully arnor-
tizated and presented a nul! gross discounted value. 
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The results of the demand estimation for the Spanish residential sector In Castro 
(1996), where the price elasticity of demand is estimated to be -1.8, is taken. 
Distribution of consumers types 
For the estimation of the distribution of consumers types the observed frequencies of 
consumption for 1993 are used. lO These frequencies are distributed in a sample space 
divided into 29 intervals, all of an amplitude of 500 kWh, with the exception of the last 
one which includes all users with a consumption of 14000 kWh or higher (see Appendix). 
The observed frequencies \vill be denoted by Ji, i = 1, ... , 29. 
The observed consumption distribution presents two distinct patterns, the lower levels 
of eonsumption present a clearly linear strueture \\'hile higher levels of eonsumption present 
a slo\\' nonlinear deerease of mass more adequateIy fitted with a Pareto density. Thus the 
fitted frequeney is gi\'en by 
if Oa < O < 00 
if 00 < O < 00, 
whieh must \'erify the follo",ing eonditions 
(00 1'(0 _ Oa)dO + (Xl al,;00-o-l = 1, 
JOa Joo 
where Da is the smallest type, 00 is \'alue of O \\'here the density funetion ehange f1'Om 
linear to Pareto, l' is the parameter of the linear part and a, k are the parameters of the 
Pareto part. 
The assoeiated distrilmtion funetion will t hen be 
In order to make the continous theoretieal distribution F(O) compatible \vith the dis-
erete sample information, the diserete probabilities that F( O) assigns to the 29 consump-
tion intervals for \\'hieh there exist obsen'ed frequencies are obtained, The theoretical 
probabilities are denoted by Pi, i = 1, ... ,29. In terms of F(O) wiil be 
.. _ { Fq(500i) - Fq(500i - 500) si 
PI - 1 - Fq(500i - 500) si 
and using the definition of Fq will be 
i ::; 28 
i = 29. 
{ 
F. (pb500i) _ F. (pb(500i - 500)) S2 i::; 28 
Pi(OO, a) = o a o a 
1 - Fo(500i - 500) S2 i = 29. 
\\'hieh is a function of the distribution parameters Oo,a. 
10This is justified by the fact that the current tariff as of 1993 is self-selective. 
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Following the discretization, the consumption space can be seen as a discrete 29 point 
space in which a probability mass function is defined. The observed frequency of each of 
these points (JI, ... , h9) are available too. 
If any of the parameters on which the theoretical distribution function is dependent 
on is unknown can be estimated by maximum likelihood. An alternative approach is 
to minimize the X2 statistic of the goodness of fit test of the observed frequencies to the 
theoretical probabilities PI, ... , P29; it is known that this is equivalent to maximum likehood 
estimation. 
Otherwise, the estimated parameters must be compatible with the observed model and 
data. In this sense, it must be taken into account that the constant tcrm of the demand 
fnnction, a, depends on (eo, 0:) since it is deriyed from the relation 
,,"he re Qo is the annal consnmption with the cmrcnt tariff structme, a two-part tariff with 
an entry fee Ao and a marginal price Po. Tlms, the parameter a can be expressed as a 
function of (eo, 0:) 
,,"ith I(e) = Jo~ e.f(e)de. 
The parameters (eo, Q) nmst giyc a yalne of a compatible with the data associated 
\\"ith the cnrrent tariff. In particular if ea is thc smallest indi\"idual that participates in 
thc cnrrcnt tarifI, its nct smplus must be nonnegatiye. This is, 
,y ( ) () a e l-b A s· = s qo, ea - por¡ Po, ea - Ao = b _ 1 aPo - o 2: O, 
,,·here Po = 15.02 ptasjkWh and Ao = 2725.74 ptas are the marginal cost and entry fce of 
t he cmrent t ariff. ll 
b 
With the previously defined demand, e is gi\"en by e = qp , and substituting into the 
a 
preyious equation the following inequality is obtained 
qaPo _ A > O. 
b-l 0_ 
Taking into account that qa, the consumption of the smallest type with the current tariff 
"'as 200k \V this restriction is always \"erified. 
The results of the estimation are presented in table 2.12 
11The entry fee is computed by using the annual power term of tariff 2.0 for a consumer with contracted 
po\\"er equal to t he a\"erage power used. 
12 A FORTRA~ minimization routine with a penalization function was used fOl" the parameter estimation. 
11 
Estimated 
parameters eo o: ea r k Stat.(x2 ) 
1314.62 1.2018 239.95 5.705e-7 942.751 20.26(37.7) 
Tabie 2: Estllnated parameters of the consllmptlon dlstnbutlOn. 
5 Optimal tariff and welfare 
To conduct efficiency comparisons with the current tariff, a two-part tariff pricing structure 
T(q) = A+pq, with a constant marginal price, p, per unit purchased and a fixed charge, A, 
per period, is considered. Both p and A are the same for all consumers. \Vith the functional 
forms introduced in the previolls section, the social welfare derived from consumption is 
given by 
Profits can be defined as 
in°
o !OCX) B = A ,.(0 - Oa)dO + A sO-o-IdO + pQ - C(Q), 
O.(A.p) 00 
\\·here Q rcpresents the total 01ltpllt anci is defined by 
In t his section three alternati"e scenarios are considered in order to analize the effi-
cienc)" of the Spanish electric system. In a first escenario it is taken as given the generating 
eqllipment and the assigment of output to the difFerent technologies. In this framework a 
first aproximation to the efficiency losses asociated exclusively to the current 1993 tariff 
versus an optimal tariff is obtained. In a second scenario it again is taken as given the 
generating equipment but a change in the assigment of output to the different technolo-
gies is allO\,·ed. This gives a second aproximation to the possible efficiency gains from an 
optim,al tariff and an optimal outpllt allocation versus the current 1993 tariff and output 
allocation. Finally in a third scenario it is simulated the optimal generating equipment 
with the current techIwlogies a"ailable in 1993. It is considered, too, the posible efficiency 
gains derived \\'hen none of the system characteristics are taken as given. 
5.1 Non adapted generating equipment 
5.1.1 Non optimal allocation of technology 
In order to compute the optimal tariff in the non optimal allocation of technology scenario, 
1993 production costs will be assigned to each consumer type. For this a particular pro-
duction mix must be assigned to each consumer. If a consumer has a constant utilization 
level then the production of the optimal technology for this utilization should be assined 
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to that consumero In the case of residential consumers the optimal technology is gas, thus 
all gas production for 1993 is assigned to residential consumers. Given that residential 
consumption for 1993 is greater than the gas production for this year other technologies 
to meet the remaining residential demand must be considered. These technologies are 
assigned according to a second best criteria, that is, the next best tecnology given the 
constant utilization level of residential consumers. Following this assigment procedure 
until total residential demand is covered the following production assignment for 1993 
residential consumption is obtained: gas (1795 G\Vh) , imported coal (8601 GWh), black 
lignite (8178 GWh), brown lignite (11641 G\Vh), and hydro (6705 GWh).13 The average 
cost for a residential consumer deri\"ed from this assingment is 8650 ptas. Non productive 
fixed costs plus profits associated to residential consumption are 11783 ptas which are 
obtained as- the difference between tariff revenues and productive costs. 
According to the definiton of marginal cost as the sum of the capacity and operating 
costs of t he efficient technalogy the marginal cost of residential consumption in 1993 is 
6.75 pesetas, which is marginal cost of gas tecnology. 
Paral1leter Itel1l Vallle 
Price elasticity b 1.8 
:-Iarginal cost (ptasjkWh) c 6.75 
Pareta elasticity Q 1.2018 
Constant clemancl a 109.3764 
Awrage COnSlll1lption (k'\'h) q 2141.15 
Utilizatian leyel (hrs.) hu 2498 
.. herage powcr Ilsee! (kW) I 0.8572 
Sl1lallest type ea 239.9452 
Table 3: Paral1lctcrs of base case. 
The yallle af all parameters t hat are llsed in the complltation of the different tariffs for 
t he base case are presented in table 3. 14 
In table 4 the \-alues of (p, A) for the Cllrrent (e), optimal (o) and llni\"ersal sen"ice tariff 
(s) are presented as well as the associated participation leyel (PL), and per consumer 
consumption level (q), ayerage po,,"er used (7), and welfare (W). The universal service 
tariff maximizes ",elfare maintaining the participation level of the current tariff. 15 In a11 
cases optimal tariffs are computed subject to a restriction of maximum power demanded 
by th~ residential sector. This restriction is determined a110wing consumers a proportion 
the system's overcapacity equal to their proportion total system contracted power. This 
restriction limits a re~idential consumer to a maximum consumption of 3183 kV/h. 
13Gi\"en the role of hydro technology as system regulator it cannot be attributed to a particular utilization 
le\"el so it is assigned proportionaly to the consumption of each consumer type. 
14The demand panimeters are obtained using the IMSL multivariate minimization subroutines. 
15The model is sol\"ed by means of GAl\IS (see Brooke et al(1988). 
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Tariff p A PL q l w 
qmax = 3183 (ptasjkWh) (pta.,,) (% ) (kWh) 
1]=0 
v 15.02 2725 100.00 2141.15 0.857 37539 
o=s 12.051 3561 100.00 3183.00 1.274 44470 
1] = 2.91 
v=o=s 15.02 2725 100.00 2141.15 0.857 1.4408E-5 
TabIe 4: Tanffs \\"lth non adapted generatmg eqmpment. 
As can ,be seen in Table 4, if the regnlator is only concerned \\"ith efficiency thus 
gh'ing all consumers an equal \yeight in total welfare function (r¡ = O), \vith a tariff 
strncture similar to t he current one it is possible to achieve a greater efficiency level while 
maintaining unh-ersal sen-ice. On the other hand, greater r¡ values give more importance 
to distribntive concerns. For a large enough valne of this parameter (r¡ = 2.91) the current 
tarifI is optimal. 
(]ma:r Tariff p A PL q 
1) = O (ptasjk\\'h) (ptas) (%) (kWh) 
4183 o 10.354 5360 99.994 4183 
s 10.633 4950 100.00 3986 
5183 o 9.190 7810 99.726 5183 
s 10.633 4950 100.00 3986 
G183 o 8.326 10802 98.939 6183 
s 10.633 4950 100.00 3986 
7183 o 7.649 14335 97.475 7183 
s 10.633 4950 100.00 3986 
8183 o 7.15·5 17989 95.437 8064 
s 10.633 4950 100.00 3986 
-
. . Tablc o: Tanfts for sc\'eral levels of maxulltUl1 cOllsnmptlOll . 
In order to analize the infiuence of the maximum power restriction, in table 5 the 
optimal tariff and the llni\'ersal service tariff for several levels of maximum allowed con-
sllmption are presented. Table 6 presents the efficiency gains for all cases considered when 
the welfare function weight is r¡ = O. \Vhen the maximum power demanded is determined 
by thé installed generating system, the optimal tariff increases welfare by more than 18% 
maintaining universal service. These welfare gains increase with the maximum allowed 
consllmption, achieving welfare gains of 47% if there is no maximum power constraint. 
However, the participation level is reduced by 95.5% with respect to the current tariff, 
that means that more than 780000 subscribers would not consume. In this case of no 
maximum po\\"er constraint the universal service tariff achieves welfare gains of 28.3% 
with respect to the current tariff. 
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qmax lV lV 6W lV 6W 
1]=0 (Current) (Optimal) (%) (Univ. serv.) (%) 
3183 37539 44470 18.46 44470 18.46 
4183 37539 48904 30.27 48161 28.30 
5183 37539 51934 38.35 48161 28.30 
6183 37539 53919 43.63 48161 28.30 
7183 37539 55041 46.62 48161 28.30 
8183 37539 55363 47.48 48161 28.30 
Table 6: \Velfare assoclated wlth new tanffs for several 
levels of maximum consumption. 
In order to \'erify the robustness of the results several alternative hypothesis for the 
base case parameters, \\'hich are given in Table 7, are analysed. The optimal and universal 
service tariffs, as \VeH as the participation level and the average consumption and power 
levels for each case are given in Table 8 (with 1] = O). Case b- computes the tariffs for a 
lo\\' elasticity assumption, this results in a lower fixed fee and a higher marginal price. This 
is becallse the more inelastic demand is, the smaller is the ",elfare gain and the greater the 
re\'enue loss from a price reduction. In t his sense a higher elasticity (case b+) will result 
in a higher marginal price and a lo\\'er fixed fee. 
Case b e (l 
Base 1.8 6.7.5 1.2018 
b- 1.7 6.75 1.2018 
b+ 1.9 6.75 1.2018 
e - 1.8 6.4 1.2018 
c+ 1.8 7.1 1.2018 
(l - 1.8 6.75 1.1518 
(\+ 1.8 6.75 1.2518 
Table 7: Parameters ,'al \les for se\'eral hypot hesis. 
\\Tith respect to t he marginal cost it can be seen that a larger difference bet"'een 
marginal cost and average cost (defined as t he ratio bet",een total cost and total residental 
consumption), reslllts in a need to fix a marginal price closer to marginal cost and verify the 
blldget constraint ",ith a larger fixed fee. When the marginal cost is larger the marginal 
price is doser the marginal costo This reslllt holds ",hile the fixed fee is restricted to 
nonnegative values. 
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Case Tariff p A PL q l 
r¡=0 (ptasjkWh) (ptas) (%) (kWh) (kW) 
base o 7.155 17989 95.437 8064 2.876 
s 10.633 4950 100.00 3986 1.596 
b- o 7.488 16203 94.570 6925 2.722 
s 10.643 5462 100.00 3846 1.539 
b+ o 6.839 20379 96.147 9472 3.791 
s 10.473 4617 100.00 4248 1.700 
e - o 6.776 18675 95.526 8896 3.561 
s 9.959 5216 100.00 4486 1.795 
c+ o 7.530 17318 95.395 7354 2.943 
s 11.253 4731 100.00 3601 1.441 
a - o 7.126 18219 95.395 8123 3.251 
s 10.633 4950 100.00 3987 1.596 
(1+ o 7.181 17789 95.465 8013 3.207 
s 10.633 4950 100.00 3987 1.596 
Table 8: Optllual and Illllyersal sernce tanffs under 
se,·eral hypot hesis. 
Regarding the "ariation of the Pareto elasticity for the distribution of consumption, 
a, a higher elasticity yalnes result in a lower fixed fee and a higher marginal price, ,vhile 
lower yalues of Q will result in a marginal price that approaches marginal costo This is 
due to the fact that higher a "alues imply a higher proportion of consumers with low 
consnmption yalues, and tlllls, raising the fixed fee in order to lower marginal price will 
strongly reduce market participation. Low a yalues, on the other hand, imply a smaller 
proportion of conslllners with low consumption "alues and thus higher fixed fees cause 
relati"ely smaller efficiency los ses in terms of a lo\\' participatian level. For sufficiently lo\\' 
a \'alnes, marginal price may eqnal marginal costo 
Case TI' lF 6W W 6W 
(Cnrrent) ( Optimal) (%) (Uniy.serv.) (%) 
Base 37539 55363 47.48 48161 28.30 
b- 43230 58826 36.08 53035 22.68 
b+ 33192 53706 61.80 45126 35.95 
e - 37539 57934 54.33 50753 35.20 
c+ 37539 53098 41.45 46029 22.62 
(1 - 37560 55515 47.20 48198 28.27 
a+ 37522 55232 47.80 48129 28.32 
Table 9: EfficJency gams under the dlfferent hypothesls. 
Table 9 preserits the efficiency gains derived under the aptimal and universal service 
tariff with respect to the current tariff under the different hypothesis considered. In all 
the cases analized the optimal tariff raises welfare by more than 36%, and can be as high 
as 61% in the high demand elasticity case. In any case it must be borne in mind that the 
leyel af participation is never greater than 96.147% of the ane acheived with the current 
tariff. The universal service tariff, on the other hand, limits the efficiency gains attainable 
to a range from 22% to 35%. 
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5.1.2 Optimal allocation of technology 
If the generating system is optimally configured given the different technologies that are in 
use in the Spanish electric system in 1993, the technology that is responsible for covering 
residential demand for a constant duration of 2498 hours v.rould be gas. 
Tarifr p A PL q l W 
(ptas/kWh) (ptas) (% ) (kWh) 
1]=0 
o 6.750 10724 99.569 9030 3.195 65764 
s 7.247 6727 100.00 7950 3.183 65450 
1] = 0.229 
o=s 7.240 67274 100.00 7950 3.183 9931 
.. Table 10: Optuual and 11l1lversal servlce tanfts for a generatmg 
system optil1lally configured. 
Table 10 presents the optimal and universal sen'ice tariffs for this case, without impos-
ing any rcstrictions on capacity. The considerable reduction in costs when the generating 
system is optimally configured implies a significant reduction both in the marginal price 
and the fixed fee of the optimal tariH, and thus a high participation level (99.569%). In 
terms of efficiency, the \\"elfare improvements are greater than 15% Loth for the optimal 
tarifl:" and the uni\'Crsal service tarifl. 
Tccllllology Capacity cost Operating cost 
(ptas/kW) (ptas/kWh) 
:\llclear 49126 1.2494 
Soft coal 17488 5.6351 
Dlln lignite 22625 5.1593 
Black lignite 26907 5.8228 
Il1lported coal 20313 3.2560 
Gas 9203 4.8571 
Hydro 7900 0.7499 
COl1lbined cycle 12081 3.9550 
Table 11: Tcchnologles costs for plants mstalled after 1980. 
On the other hand, to measure the distorsions derived by the use of a non adapted 
generating system it is necesary to consider the evolution of the Spanish electricity industry 
\\"ith a strong im'estment in gas-oil plants in the sixties and the seventies that are not used 
after the oi! crisis, and that at the current international prices are again efficient given the 
installed generating system. The current generating system is composed mainly of very 
old plants, some of which are amortized, which resuIts in a infravaluation of the capacity 
cost of the installed generating system. TaLle 11 presents the cost data of generating 
plants that carne into service since 1980. 
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Tariff p A LP q I W 
(ptasjkWh) (ptas) (% ) (kWh) (kW) 
7]=0 
o 8.614 10348 99.012 5817 2.328 52629 
s 9.668 5342 100.00 4732 1.894 51973 
7] = 0.9 
o=s 10.943 1579 100.00 3786 1.516 39.850 
r¡ = 1.5 
o=s 11.741 O 100.00 3335 1.335 0.457 
Table 12: Optllual and umversal serVlce tanffs for an ophmally 
confignred generating system with plants installed after 1980. 
Considering the data from table 11 gas is still the most efficient technology to serve 
residential consumption, and the cost function in this case is given by a fixed cost of 10678 
per consumer and a marginal cost of 8.54 ptas. The optimal and universal ser vice tariffs 
for different values of 7] are given in table 12 and will allo\\' to make efficiency comparisons 
with respect to an adapted generating system. 
5.2 Adapted generating equipment 
Table 13 presents the optimal and universal sen-ice tarifIs for residential conSllmers when 
an adapted generating system is considered, that is, a system composed by the most ef-
ficient teclmologies a\'ailable and operating in an efficient \Vay. This scenario reflects a 
sit1lation of long rllll equilibrium in a competiti\'e generation market. In particular com-
bined cycle teclmology not present in the 1993 generating system is the most efficient 
tec:hnology to sen'e residential consumption. The cost that are associated with this tech-
llology \\'ere obtained from Enropean manufactnrers and are estimated to be 11084 ptas 
per installed kilowatt of capacity and 3955 ptas per hour of dnration. This results in a 
marginal cost for the le\'el of residential utilization of 8.39.16 
Tariff p A LP q I W 
(ptasjk\\'h) (ptas) (% ) (kWh) (kW) 
1) = O 
o 8.456 10379 99.065 6015 2.407 53537 
s 9.453 5438 100.00 4927 1.972 52913 
r¡ = 0.9 
0=5 10.751 1449 100.00 3909 1.565 40.624 
7) = 1.5 
o=s 11.450 O 100.00 3490 1.397 0.466 
Table 13: Tanffs for adapted generatmg eqmpment. 
An approximation of the regulatory distortions in the Spanish system as of 1993 can 
Le obtained comparing the welfare derived from the tariffs computed \Vith a non adapted 
lGThese figures were outained from CSEN, the Regulatory Comission of Spanish electricity industry, and 
REE, the National Grid Company in Spain. 
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generating system, where gas and coal technologies are serving residential consumers, 
which follows from the costs studies in the l\ILE, and the welfare derived with the optimal 
tariffs that are obtained when residential consumption is served by combined cycle and 
coal technologies. In Table can be seen that the efficiency gains derived from the use of 
combined cycle technologies are greater than 1.70% for the optimal tariff. 
w W I1W 
Case Gas Combined cycle (%) 
1]=0 
o 52629 53537 1.70 
s 51973 52913 1.78 
1] = 0.9 
o=s 39.850 40.624 1.91 
1] = 1.5 
o=s 0.457 0.466 1.93 
.. Table 14: Efficlency gams den\'ed from the 1lse of 
combined cycle teclmologies. 
6 Conclusions 
Tariff discrimination oy lltilization le\'el attempts to attain the efficiency gains associated 
with the use of capacity tariffs oased on duration, oy llsing information on consumption 
and used power. In this sense it incorporates the optimality concerns of a capacity price 
structure, out it relys on an assumption of homogeniety in the consumption duration 
patterns of clifferent incliYidllals. 
In the case of the Spanish electricity industry two other factors may weaken the op-
timality oojecti\'e of the tariff strncture. First, the tariff estaolishes a limited numoer of 
lltilization ranges oased Oll the distrioutioll of consumers and not the different costs of the 
technologies used in order to sllpply these consumers. Second, an objective function for 
t he regulator is not specified. 
In this paper se\'eral two part tariff for residential usage level are computed considering 
seyeral alternative hypothesis on the installed generating system. Taking as given the 
generating equipment and the 01ltput assigment to the different technologies, the optimal 
tariff jncreases ",elfare by more than 18% maintaining universal service. On the other 
hand, the welfare losses associated to a non optimal mix of production technologies are 
larger than 1.7%. These welfare losses are larger when the regulator is concerned not only 
with efficiency but also with distributive issues. In any sense, this means that the smaller 
consumers are penalized with the current regulatory framework. 
It ",ould be interesting to complement the current Spanish tariff structure based on 
lltilization levels with time of use tariffs. These would allow to capture the divergences 
in demand and operating costs in the short termo For this, a multiproduct formulation 
would be more usefull. 
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7 Appendix 
7.1 Agregated costs in time periods 
In the costs agregation by vertical intervals the consumption costs for each time period are 
beeing considered. Figure 5 shows, for example, that each hour h in which the consumer's 
load L(h) is in the range L2 < L(h) < Ll is identified with the source JI that is the 
marginal generator in that hour. The marginal cost of energy es therefore V2, but in 
addition the inframarginal units of power are generated with the source J J J. The total 
cost of consumed energy in hour h is the sum the marginal costs of energy from the sources 
used. 
Insert Figure 5 
The total costs to meet the customer's load-duration curve can be derived by inte-
grating by parts the formula for the total cost of the consumption set \\'hen horizontal 
intervals are considered, and can be "Titten in the case of three tecnologies as 
7.2 Two part tariff problem 
7.2.1 Social \Velfare (\V) 
The social welfare deri\'ed can be \\'ritten as 
\\'ith this ecuation the social ,,'elfare can be \\'ritten as 
e3-ry e e2-ry e3-ry e e2-ry a l-b [ o a O * + a * 1 
--p r--- ---
b-l 3-r¡ 2-r¡ 3-r¡ 2-r¡ 
IV = 
e2-ry e e1-ry e 2-ry e e1-ry 
-Ar[-O- _ a O __ *_ + a * 1 
2-r¡ l-r¡ 2-r¡ l-r¡ 
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7.2.2 Profit (B) 
The profit can be defined as 
le
BO le 00 B = A r(O - Oa)dO + A so-a-IdO + (p - m)Q - cf 
B.(A,p) Bo 
where Q represents the total outpllt consumed and is defined as 
Sustituing and solving the integral the profit can be written as 
Od+2 O 02 03 O 02 
, ( ) -b [ * a O 1 + a *] 
- p - 117 ap l' -- - -- - - --
, 3 232 
7.2.3 Marginal Consumer Surplus (Ee1) 
The marginal consumer 0* can oe defined as the consumer with a nu11 net SurplllS. This 
SurplllS can Le defined llsing t he last ecuation as 
a l-b d EC* = -b-P 0* - A. 
-1 
Then, the marginal conSllmer ,,·ill be 
(
b - 1) ¿ 1 h-l O.(.4,p) = -a- Adp-d. 
7.2.4 Problem 
It is the reslllt of the fo11owing optimization program 
[P] = { max{A,p} W 
s.a. B ~ O 
where \V and B are the fllnctions defined aLove. The theoretical solution to problem is as 
fo11o,,"s 
p - rn o: [ q(p,O*) 1 
-p- = ep(p,O*) 1- Q(p,O*) , 
A + (p - m)q(p, 0*) [1 - F(O*)] 
A = o: A f(O*) aO*/aA' 
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where o: = .A~l, with .x as Lagrangian multiplier, and 
- Jt q(p, B)j(B)dB 
Q(p, B*) = Jo":' j(B)dB ' 
Q(p, e*) = ¡CJO q(p, B)j(B)de, Jo. 
The explicit solution to p and A have to be computed with numerical computation 
because it depends if the yalue B* is in the linear or Pareto part of the types distribution. 
7.3 Data 
7.3.1 Frequencies of consumption 
rnten'al Frequency (7c) rnteryal Frequency ('Jo) 
o 500 8.61 7501 8000 0.36 
501 1000 19.17 8001 8500 0.28 
1001 1500 18.70 8501 9000 0.21 
1501 2000 1-1.73 9001 9500 0.17 
2001 2500 10.79 9501 10000 0.13 
2501 3000 7.71 10001 10500 0.10 
3001 3500 5.-18 10501 11000 0.08 
3501 -1000 3.90 11001 11500 0.07 
-1001 -1500 2.80 11501 12000 0.05 
-1501 5000 2.03 12001 12500 0.0-1 
5001 5500 1.-18 12501 13000 0.0-1 
5501 6000 1.10 13001 13500 0.03 
6001 6500 0.82 13501 1-1000 0.02 
6501 7000 0.61 1-1001 1-1500 0.02 
7001 7500 0.47 
7.3.2 Tariff 2.0 in 1993 
Parameter Item Value 
Suscriuers (thousands) N 17243 
Power used (11W) P 60690 
Consumption (GWh) Qo 36920 
Billing (mil.ptas) 1 747340 
Price (ptasjkWh) po 15.02 
Fixed fee (ptas) Ao 2725.74 
Power charge (ptasjkW,year) P.C. 265 
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Figure 2: Optimal mix of production technologies. 
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Figure 5: Vertical slice costs of load-duration curve. 
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